Asymmetric Benefits: The Ethio-Eritrea Common Market (1991 to 1998) by Aberra, Worku
International Journal of African Development v.4 n.1 Fall 2016 55  
Asymmetric Benefits: The Ethio-Eritrea Common Market (1991-1998) 
 
Worku Aberra, Dawson College, Westmount, Quebec 
 
Abstract 
Economic theory suggests that a common market between two or more countries improves 
overall well-being, but it creates winners and losers in each country. Recent empirical 
findings also show that the overall impact of a common market on per capita income 
depends on the similarity of economic development between member countries. A 
common market among developed countries results in the convergence of per capita 
income while a common market among developing countries results in the divergence of 
per capita income. The difference in outcome, some economists suggest, is due to 
variations in comparative advantage between member states and the rest of the world. But 
the theory of comparative advantage does not fully explain the results of the de facto 
common market between Ethiopia and Eritrea (1991-1998). The empirical findings of this 
study demonstrate that the Ethio-Eritrea preferential trade arrangement benefited Eritrea 
and harmed Ethiopia.  The main reason for these asymmetric consequences was acceptance 
by the Ethiopian government of the unfavourable terms of the preferential trade 
arrangement between the two countries.   
 
Background 
Economic theory suggests that a common market between two or more countries improves 
overall well-being, but such a market also creates winners and losers in each country because of 
the flow of capital, labor, goods, and services across the member countries (Venables, 2016). When 
capital flows from countries with a low rate of profit (capital-abundant countries) to countries with 
a high rate of profit (capital-poor countries), it reduces the difference in the rate of profit, and 
owners of capital in countries with a high rate of profit lose while owners of capital in countries 
with a low rate of profit gain. When labor migrates from low-wage countries (labor-abundant 
countries) to high-wage countries (labor-poor countries), it decreases the wage rate differential, 
and workers in the high-wage countries lose while workers in the low-wage countries win. The 
free flow of goods and services creates winners and losers as well. Owners of capital and workers 
engaged in export and related sectors benefit, while owners of capital and workers engaged in 
import-competing and related sectors generally lose, but it is unlikely that all industries suffer; 
companies and workers producing goods that complement imports benefit.    
 In a common market, because of duty-free and low-tariff imports, consumers in each 
country have more choices of goods and services at lower prices. Imports may also encourage 
domestic producers, especially those who face competition from these imports, to introduce 
technological change, resulting in economy-wide benefits. The increase in the production of 
exports enables some firms to realize economies of scale and to reduce their costs of production 
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that can be passed on to domestic and foreign consumers as lower prices. Thus, the creation of a 
common market improves welfare, but it also generates distributional inequities.  
To make the distributional outcomes fair, economists suggest that the winners compensate 
the losers or that governments establish programs to mitigate the negative effects of trade 
displacement (Ehrlich & Hearn, 2013). In reality, however, the losers are rarely compensated nor 
are effective programs established for displaced workers; the winners enjoy the benefits, and the 
losers suffer the losses (Ehrlich & Hearn, 2013).  Empirical studies illustrate that the overall effects 
of a common market on per capita income, despite the sectoral income imbalances that such a 
market creates, hinge on the similarity of economic development between member countries. “A 
common market among developed countries results in the convergence of per capita income while 
a common market among developing countries results in the divergence of per capita income” 
(Venables, 2003, pp. 747–48). Venables attributes this outcome to differences in comparative 
advantage between member states and the rest of the world. Let us apply his hypothesis to the 
outcomes of the de facto Ethio-Eritrea common market. Assuming Eritrea has a slight comparative 
advantage over Ethiopia in skilled manpower but a relatively abundant unskilled labour force vis-
à-vis the rest of the world; and assuming that Ethiopia has a comparative advantage in agriculture 
over Eritrea and the rest of the world, Eritrea will be exporting manufactured goods to Ethiopia, 
and Ethiopia will be exporting agricultural goods to Eritrea. The difference in relative factor 
abundance between the two countries, the hypothesis suggests, will result in Eritrea’s per capita 
income increasing at a faster rate than Ethiopia’s; the gains for Eritrea will be higher than those of 
Ethiopia. The empirical evidence presented in this paper appears consistent with this proposition, 
but the benefits that Eritrea enjoyed from the common market extended far beyond the gains 
attributable to differences in relative comparative advantage between the two countries. To fully 
understand the economic consequences of the Ethio-Eritrea common market (1991 - 1998) for 
both countries, we must examine the nature of the economic relationship that existed between 
them.  
Even though Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia in 1991 and became formally independent in 
1993, it remained economically integrated with Ethiopia until 1998 when war broke out and formal 
economic ties ended. Prewar economic integration between the two countries included a free-trade 
area, a partial customs union, and currency and monetary unions (IMF, 1995; Tesfai, n.d.; Trivelli, 
1998; Woldemariam, 2015). Following independence in 1993, the Eritrean government advocated 
an economic union with Ethiopia and wanted to harmonize fiscal, monetary, taxation, and other 
policies (Asrat, 2014; ESAT, 2015; Yohannes, 1993), but the attempt failed largely because the 
terms and implementation of the extant preferential arrangement favored Eritrea. Although the 
preferential trade arrangement between Eritrea and Ethiopia was extensive, it lacked a 
comprehensive formal agreement. To be sure, various attempts were made to formalize the 
arrangement, beginning from the time Eritrea became independent. In July 1993, Presidents Meles 
Zenawi of Ethiopia and Isaias Afeworki of Eritrea signed the Friendship and Cooperation 
Agreement, a broad outline for collaboration (IMF, 1995; Tesfai, n.d.; Woldemariam, 2015). In 
September 1993, the Asmara Pact, an agreement to harmonize economic policies, was signed in 
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Asmara (Tesfai, n.d.; Woldemariam, 2015). Throughout the 1990s, various ministerial and 
interparty committees signed additional agreements, almost all initiated by the Eritrean 
government (Asrat, 2014). The agreements covered a wide range of areas for economic, security, 
and political cooperation between the two countries, but none were fully implemented because of 
divergent views, mutual suspicion, and conflicting interests (Asrat, 2014; Iyob, 2000).  
The two governments agreed in April 1995 to formally create a free trade area (IMF, 1996), 
yet a comprehensive accord was never signed. Although the Eritrean Peoples’ Liberation Front 
(EPLF), now The People’s Front for Democracy and Justice, and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation 
Front (TPLF) signed a few agreements on behalf of their respective governments (the EPLF for 
Eritrea and the TPLF for Ethiopia), but none was ratified by the Ethiopian parliament. This, despite 
the fact that Article 54 of the Ethiopian constitution requires all international treaties signed by the 
government be ratified by parliament. Article 54, Section 12 reads, “It [parliament] shall ratify 
international agreements negotiated and signed by the Executive” (Constitution of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995). Had the agreements been introduced to parliament, the 
ensuing public discussion would have confirmed the widely-held perception that the Ethiopian 
government is ambivalent to Ethiopia’s national interests. It is even possible that some members 
of the parliament controlled by the TPLF would have opposed the treaties. The TPLF, concerned 
about the negative public reaction to the terms of the agreements, decided not to bring any of the 
agreements to parliament for ratification. The lack of parliamentary ratification raises questions 
about the legality of the preferential arrangement between the two countries. The common market, 
although it lacked a legally binding comprehensive accord, lasted from 1991 to 1998. The lack of 
a formal treaty, more specifically, the absence of a dispute settlement mechanism, along with the 
EPLF’s persistent violation of the agreements and engagement in contraband activities in Ethiopia, 
as pointed out by some researchers (Asrat, 2014; Kendie, 2005; Trevilli, 1998), was a constant 
source of friction between the two governments throughout this period. The unique economic 
relationship that Eritrea and Ethiopia formed after Eritrea became independent and the subsequent 
cessation of economic ties in 1998 has created a state of natural experiment in which researchers 
can analyse the “before” situation, the economic conditions under the common market, and the 
“after” situation, the economic conditions in the wake of the dissolution of the common market, in 
both Ethiopia and Eritrea. Despite this unique opportunity, there has been no empirical 
investigation of the consequences of the common market for both countries.  
The extensive literature on the war between the two countries often mentions economic 
factors that contributed to or gave rise to the war, but none of the authors discuss the details or 
outcomes of the common market. Some researchers, without discussing the specifics of the 
economic relationship, have concluded that the arrangement benefited Eritrea disproportionately. 
Gilkes notes, “[I]t was Eritrea and Eritreans who had largely benefited at the expense of Ethiopia” 
(cited in Khadiagata, 1999, p. 5). Trevilli (1998) points out, “The various agreements between the 
TGE and the Government of Eritrea (GOE) were very advantageous for the Eritrean side” (p. 277). 
Abbink (1998) states that until 1997 the Ethiopian government followed a “[R]ather Eritrea-
friendly economic policy” (p. 9). Asrat (2014) wrote an entire book that claims how the Meles 
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Zenawi government betrayed the national interests of Ethiopia and advanced those of Eritrea. 
Among the public, unsurprisingly, there is no consensus between Ethiopians and Eritreans on the 
distribution of the economic benefits of the common market. The debate on the distribution of the 
gains from the Ethio-Eritrean common market is not unique; it is a universal feature of the 
discussion on the distributional consequences of a common market, as the benefits of a common 
market can never be equally distributed between the participating countries (Burfisher, Robinson 
& Thierfelder. 2001). In general, although theoretically and empirically one country often benefits 
more than the other, both will gain, however small those gains may be for the relative “loser.”  
Nonetheless, contrary to what economic theory suggests, the Ethio-Eritrea common market 
generated a skewed distribution of costs and benefits with the benefits going to Eritrea, and the 
costs falling on Ethiopia. The reason for this imbalance is that the Ethiopian government allowed 
the Eritrean government to transfer Ethiopia’s resources to Eritrea without any reciprocal flow of 
goods, services, assets or obligations to Ethiopia. Given the welfare costs that Ethiopia suffered 
from the common market, why did the Ethiopian government agree to such an arrangement in the 
first place? To answer this question, I will briefly outline one plausible hypothesis.  
 
Theoretical Discussion 
Even though it is difficult to satisfactorily explain the preferential trade arrangement 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea within the existing theoretical framework of international trade 
agreements, a political economy approach based on rational choice theory ((Baldwin, 1989; Gilpin, 
2001; Maggi & Rodríguez-Clare, 2007; Mansfield & Milner, 2012; Milner, 1999) which states 
that decision makers weigh the expected costs and benefits of each of the alternative options 
available to them and choose the one whose benefits outweigh the costs (Eggertsson, 1998; ). To 
understand the pro-EPLF policy of the TPLF-controlled transitional government, we need to 
consider the two options that the TPLF leadership faced in its attempt to stay in power after it 
formed the government in 1991: allying with the EPLF or allying with the Ethiopian People’s 
Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPRDF.) In 1991 when the TPLF assumed power in Ethiopia, 
it lacked a powerful domestic base within the coalition parties of the EPRDF or among the 
Ethiopian people. It had to turn to the EPLF for support. As Trivelli (1998) noted, “[U]ntil military 
victory had been translated into political hegemony, the EPRDF would need the alliance with the 
EPLF to be able to fully concentrate on securing its position within Ethiopia” (p. 276).  Iyob (2000) 
writes about “[T]he TPLF-EPLF intelligence and security cooperation, which had ensured the 
supremacy of the TPLF in the EPRDF coalition…” (p. 677). Woldemariam (2015) acknowledges 
the crucial role the EPLF played in training and arming the TPLF army before and after the latter 
came to power. Sargo (2006) states that the EPLF even attempted to weaken the TPLF so as to 
make it more dependent on the EPLF, for example by blowing up arms depots in Addis Ababa and 
Dire Dawa when the joint TPLF-EPLF forces entered Addis Ababa in May 1991 and by 
ingratiating itself with the opposition throughout the early 1990s.  The EPLF did this while 
simultaneously supporting the TPLF not just militarily but politically by using Eritreans living in 
International Journal of African Development v.4 n.1 Fall 2016 59  
Ethiopia to mobilize the Oromos and the people in Southern Ethiopia to support the new 
government.  
 The EPLF, the TPLF’s strategic ally during the struggle against the Derg, thus provided 
the support the latter needed in the early days of its assumption of power, but that support came at 
a price: the transfer of Ethiopia’s resources. This support, mediated by their past friendly 
relationship (although at times conflictual) and shared anti-Ethiopian views, was based on mutual 
benefits. The TPLF required the EPLF’s military and political support, and the EPLF needed 
resources to embark on its ambitious plan of turning Eritrea into the Horn of Africa’s “Singapore” 
within two decades (Asrat, 2014; Giorgis, 2010). The reciprocal coincidence of needs resulted in 
the common market arrangement that benefitted the EPLF tremendously but hurt Ethiopia 
drastically. 
So, rational choice theory surmises that as a result of the uncertainty the TPLF leadership 
faced during the early days of its rule, it opted to ally with the EPLF; ready to reward the EPLF 
with economic benefits in return for political and military assistance. But once the regime felt 
securely established in power in the late 1990s, a faction within the TPLF realized that it could 
appropriate, using the TPLF-owned companies, the benefits accruing to the EPLF, and persuaded 
the party to renegotiate the trade arrangement with Eritrea in 1997. To illustrate the fight between 
the two fronts over who should appropriate Ethiopia’s resources, let’s take one of Asrat’s (2014) 
accounts. He relates a story of how the regional government of Tigray in 1992 caught thirty-eight 
trailer trucks loaded with sesame seeds, worth birr 38 million, attempting to cross the border to 
Eritrea. He alleges that this is a smuggling operation organized by the EPLF. He reports that the 
seeds were duly confiscated without telling us who confiscated them, but it is clear that it was the 
regional government of Tigray run by the TPLF under his rule. He also mentions other incidents 
in which the regional government of Tigray confiscated goods that were about to be smuggled into 
Eritrea from Ethiopia and goods smuggled into Ethiopia by the EPLF. Further, he argues that the 
regional government was concerned about the negative impact of imports from Eritrea on the 
nascent manufacturing sector in northern Ethiopia, primarily in Tigray. These narratives exemplify 
the motivation behind the decision to renegotiate the agreement: to redirect the appropriation of 
Ethiopia’s resources from the EPLF to the TPLF. In essence, the renegotiation reflected the resolve 
by a faction within the TPF to restrict the EPLF’s access to Ethiopia’s economy and redirect the 
flow of rents to TPLF officials and to the TPLF-owned companies. There were a few factors that 
triggered the dissolution of the common market. Even though the common market lasted until 
1998, it lacked effective dispute settlement mechanisms to deal with the issues, conflicts, and 
problems that the extant agreements failed to address satisfactorily for both parties. These included 
Eritrea’s use of multiple exchange rates for the birr, the status of Eritreans living in Ethiopia, the 
distribution of petroleum products from the Assab Refinery, the EPLF’s demand for parity 
between the birr and its newly issued currency, the Nakfa, in 1997, and its request for the free 
circulation of the Nakfa in Ethiopia, plus other concerns (Asrat, 2014; Trevilli, 1999).  
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Data Limitations 
When undertaking the research, unsurprisingly, some data problems were encountered. As 
is generally the case, economic data supplied by government agencies in developing countries, 
especially those in Africa, are notoriously unreliable because of the lack of funds, lack of trained 
manpower, and inadequate statistical infrastructure, in addition to political considerations (Jerven, 
2013). To obtain data, I used the various issues of the IMF’s Staff Country Reports (1995 to 2003) 
on Eritrea for data on trade, monetary statistics, tax and nontax revenues, and the distribution of 
petroleum products between Eritrea and Ethiopia refined at the Assab Refinery. The IMF in turn 
obtained these data from various Eritrean government agencies, namely the Bank of Eritrea, the 
Customs Office, and the Eritrean Petroleum Corporation. Along with the systemic problem of data 
unreliability, it is highly likely that the Eritrean government took political considerations into 
account when providing some of the data to the IMF. 
It is highly probable, for example, that the EPLF may have under-reported cash transfers 
from the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) to Eritrea, a cash gift from the Ethiopian government 
to the EPLF, while it may have overstated the monetary liabilities of Ethiopia to Eritrea. Asrat 
(2014), for instance, recounts that Meles Zenawi, without the approval of the Council of Ministers, 
ordered the NBE to transfer birr 1.2 billion to Eritrea in 1992. The transfer was later acknowledged, 
but the reported amount of the cash transfer from Ethiopia to Eritrea in 1992 was less than birr 1 
billion (IMF, 1995). 
Second, the data on Eritrea’s imports from Ethiopia and Eritrea’s exports to other countries, 
subject to the overall problems of data inaccuracies, have also been affected by political 
considerations. In the 1990s, there were persistent accounts in the Ethiopian media about how 
Eritrea became a leading exporter of coffee by re-exporting the coffee it imported from Ethiopia 
(Ethiomedia, December 2004). The media reports have been corroborated by Asrat (2014) who 
confirms that the EPLF bought Ethiopia’s export commodities in large quantities, with the full 
knowledge of the Ethiopian government, then transported them across the border using donkeys, 
camels, and trucks, and sold them on the international market. Kendie (2005) also reports that 
throughout the years of the common market, the EPLF imported large quantities of agricultural 
products from Ethiopia and exported them. However, in all of its officially reported trade statistics, 
the Eritrean government has not indicated any coffee imports from Ethiopia or coffee exports to 
the rest of the world. Obviously, there are political reasons behind the Eritrean regime’s lack of 
transparency on its coffee trade, including its fear of being accused of violating the 1993 Friendship 
and Cooperation Agreement that prohibited the re-export of Ethiopia’s export commodities. The 
agreement forbade Eritrea from purchasing in birr any of Ethiopian export products and goods that 
were in short supply in Ethiopia (IMF, 1995). As specified in the agreement, Eritrea must pay for 
these goods in foreign currency, but the EPLF violated the agreement by purchasing these products 
with birr in Ethiopia and exporting them (Asrat, 2014). Despite the Eritrean government’s non-
reporting of its international trade of coffee, a comparison of the aggregate data on Eritrea’s 
exports, during and after the dissolution of the common market, reveal a substantial decrease in 
Eritrea’s total exports after Eritrea ended its economic ties with Ethiopia (World Bank, 2000). My 
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calculations indicate that Eritrea’s exports, expressed as a percentage of GDP, decreased from 31 
per cent in 1994 to 10 per cent in 2000, after Eritrea stopped exporting to and importing from 
Ethiopia. As will be shown later, Ethiopia was Eritrea’s most important trading partner; and with 
the cessation of imports from Ethiopia, Eritrea could no longer re-export the agricultural 
products—oil seeds, pulses, leather, hides and skins, live animals, and coffee—that it imported 
from Ethiopia. These data limitations notwithstanding, this paper will reveal how the de facto 
common market benefitted Eritrea but harmed Ethiopia. The reason for the skewed distribution of 
the costs and benefits of the common market is that with the acquiescence, cooperation, and 
facilitation of the Ethiopian government, the preferential arrangement created transmission 
mechanisms, official and unofficial, legal and illegal, that permitted the EPLF to transfer 
Ethiopia’s resources to Eritrea.  
The official and legal transfer mechanisms included the following: cash deliveries from 
Ethiopia to Eritrea, Eritrea’s export of manufactured goods to Ethiopia duty free, Eritrea’s import 
of agricultural goods and food from Ethiopia duty free, purchased at domestic prices with 
Ethiopia’s domestic currency. In addition, there were service fees paid by Ethiopia for its use of 
the “free” ports of Massawa and Assab, the subsidy Ethiopia provided to Eritrea when purchasing 
the petroleum products refined at the Assab Refinery, and the fees Ethiopia paid for using the 
refinery. As stated by Asrat (2014) and others, the EPLF’s unofficial and illegal means of resource 
transfer included contraband trade, appropriation of Ethiopia’s foreign exchange reserves by using 
multiple exchange rates for the birr, re-exportation of Ethiopia’s export commodities, and the 
unrecorded remittances of Eritreans living in Ethiopia (IMF, 1995).  Asrat (2014) reports that the 
EPLF was engaged in a two-way smuggling operation. It smuggled Ethiopia’s export commodities 
out of Ethiopia. It also smuggled goods into Ethiopia, mostly electronic products but other goods 
as well, such as guns and whiskey, into Ethiopia using the provision of the 1993 agreement that 
allowed the transit of goods from Eritrea destined for other countries in East Africa (and vice versa) 
to pass through Ethiopia duty free and uninspected. Similarly, as reported by Kendie (2005), the 
EPLF imported different types of goods through Mombasa claiming that they were goods in transit, 
and sold them illegally in Ethiopia. To undertake its unlawful activities in Ethiopia, to purchase 
goods in Ethiopia that it smuggled to Eritrea or to distribute the smuggled goods in Ethiopia, the 
EPLF used, Asrat (2014) contends, Eritrean diplomats and its agents working at its embassy in 
Addis Ababa and its consulates in Mekele, Asayta, and other cities, as well as Eritrean and 
Ethiopian businessmen, including Meles Zenawi’s’ father (Asrat, 2014), along with its state-
owned companies. Eritrea also benefitted in other ways from the EPLF’s cordial relationship with 
TPLF in which the latter allowed the former to acquire all of Ethiopia’s physical assets located in 
Eritrea without receiving any monetary compensation. What is more, the Ethiopian government 
cancelled Eritrea’s share of Ethiopia’s external and internal debt at the time of Eritrea’s 
independence. The following sections will examine closely each of the mechanisms the EPLF used 
to transfer resources from Ethiopia to Eritrea with the explicit and implicit approval of the TPLF. 
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The EPLF’s Expropriation of Ethiopia’s Financial Assets 
When Eritrea became de facto independent in 1991, the EPLF expropriated all of the 
physical and financial assets belonging to the eleven branches of the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia 
(CBE), one branch of the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank (AIDB), and the Asmara 
branch of the NBE (IMF, 1995). Neither the EPLF nor the Ethiopian government has provided any 
data on the total value of bank assets in Eritrea that were expropriated by the EPLF, but there are 
IMF data that partially indicate the amount of cash seized by the EPLF, with the caveat that the 
source of the IMF data was the EPLF itself, as indicated previously.  
Along with the cash that it expropriated from the banks when it entered Asmara, the EPLF 
also received a number of cash deliveries from the transitional government in Ethiopia, mostly in 
1992 and 1993, without providing any assets, goods, or services or assuming any obligations in 
return. The financial data provided by the IMF (1995), showed that, between 1991 and 1993 alone, 
the EPLF acquired almost birr 1.3 billion through its cash acquisitions and cash deliveries from 
the Ethiopian government. The actual amount of cash transfers from Ethiopia to Eritrea during this 
period was most probably higher than what was reported. It is most likely that the Eritrean 
monetary authorities under-reported the cash transfers from Ethiopia. As stated above, Asrat 
reports (2014) that in 1992 Meles Zenawi authorized the NBE to transfer birr 1.2 billion to Eritrea, 
but not all of this transfer was reported. Between 1991 and 1992, the reported total amount of cash 
held by the banks in Eritrea increased by only birr 673.6 million (IMF, 1995). Further, there have 
been persistent rumours in the Ethiopian media that the EPLF took cash and other assets from 
Ethiopia with the approval of the prime minister. For example, as reported by Ethiomedia, the 
EPLF flew birr 70 billion in 1994 (equivalent to US $32 million) in a Cessna airplane from Addis 
Ababa to Asmara (Ethiomedia. April 10, 2014). One of the EPLF’s reasons for requesting cash 
deliveries from Ethiopia was that it needed the cash to cover the deposits of the CBE’s former 
customers, but it is difficult to conclude if the demand is justifiable since there are no public data 
that suggest the CBE owed money to the Eritrean government; if anything, it is highly plausible 
that the Eritrean regime owed money to the CBE. As previously mentioned, the EPLF took all of 
the CBE’s physical and financial assets, including the cash held in the bank’s vault, and renamed 
it the Commercial Bank of Eritrea (CBER). Normally, when a government acquires a bank, it 
assumes all of the bank’s assets and liabilities. Yet, when the Eritrean government seized all of 
CBE’s assets in Eritrea and transferred them to the CBER, it demanded further cash deliveries 
from Ethiopia to cover the deposits of the previous customers of the CBE in Eritrea, to which the 
transitional government obliged. The IMF (1995) reports, “Between August 1991 and end-1992, 
the CBER [the Commercial Bank of Eritrea] received cash transfers amounting to birr 375 million 
to partially cover its deposit liabilities” (p. 25). In the absence of public data on CBE’s deposits at 
the time that it was acquired by the EPLF, it is impossible to deduce if the transfer was justified or 
not. In fact, it was most unusual for the CBE to transfer any cash to cover, partially or wholly, the 
deposits of its former customers, when it did not receive full payment for its physical assets, cash 
in vault, or outstanding loans that the EPLF expropriated. As stated by the IMF (1995), in 1995 
there was still birr 53 million under negotiations and concludes that “[T]here are unresolved issues 
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regarding the loans supplied by the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia to enterprises in Eritrea, prior 
to May 1991, which are unlikely to be recovered” (p. 25). In the early 1990s, there was also a 
continual flow of cash to Eritrea from Ethiopia, shown as positive entries in the “errors and 
omissions” component of Eritrea’s balance of payments with Ethiopia; a cash transfer not officially 
accounted for. The IMF report (1995) says, “The errors and omissions component of the balance 
of payments with Ethiopia is affected by various factors, including, most notably unrecorded 
across-the border trade transactions as well as movement of private capital flows” (p. 31). The 
IMF report shows some of the cash that was recorded as “private capital flows” was actually cash 
deliveries from the NBE to Eritrea purportedly to cover the previous deposits of the CBE in Eritrea. 
For example, in 1992, this transfer amounted to US $58.9 million (IMF, 1995).  
The legal, semi-legal, and illegal transfer of cash from Ethiopia, the IMF documents 
indicate, continued throughout the period of Eritrea’s economic integration with Ethiopia, albeit 
at a lower rate in the later years, resulting in a large accumulation of cash in Eritrea. Some of the 
accumulated birr in Eritrea flowed back to Ethiopia, as indicated by the negative entries in Eritrea’s 
balance of payments with Ethiopia, again under the category “errors and omissions,” to buy more 
of Ethiopia’s resources and assets. The reason for the flow of cash from Eritrea back to Ethiopia 
was the higher rates of interest and profit (IMF, 1996) in Ethiopia than in Eritrea. The amount of 
the cash transfers, even if we take only the officially reported cash transfers, were not 
inconsequential. In 1992, the amount of cash transferred from Ethiopia to Eritrea was so large that 
it alarmed the IMF; it reported in 1995 that there was, “Excessive liquidity in Eritrea's banking 
system accumulated largely during 1992…” (IMF, 1995, p. 24).  
The impact of these cash transfers on the economies of Eritrea and Ethiopia was much 
larger than the transfers themselves because of the combined effects of the money multiplier and 
velocity of money. The money multiplier indicates by how much the amount of money in 
circulation increases when reserves increase, depending on the required reserves, cash drain, and 
the level of monetization in an economy. The cash transfers from Ethiopia to Eritrea constitute an 
increase in the monetary base of Eritrea’s money supply. An increase in cash held by the banks, 
the monetary base, will result in a much larger amount of money in circulation, subject to the 
required reserve ratio and the variables mentioned above. In the 1990s, the IMF states that “[T]here 
are no statutory reserve requirements in place…” in Eritrea (IMF, 1995, p. 22). This means, with 
low or virtually no reserve requirements in the Eritrean banking system in the early 1990s, the cash 
transfers from Ethiopia resulted in a large increase in the amount of money in circulation in Eritrea. 
With the cash transfer that totalled close to birr 1.3 billion between 1991 and 1993 alone, if we 
assume a reserve ratio of 5 per cent, the increase in the money supply during this period would be 
close to birr 26 billion. This substantial expansion of Eritrea’s money supply caused the IMF to 
issue a warning in 1995 that the increases could have harmful economic consequences for Ethiopia, 
specifying that “[E]xcess liquidity could prove inimical to financial stability in the birr area 
[Ethiopia]” (IMF, 1995, p. 24). Additionally, the velocity of money, defined as the number of 
times a unit of money changes hands, enabled the EPLF to acquire a higher amount of Ethiopia’s 
resources than is reflected in the total of the transfers themselves. In economies such as those of 
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Ethiopia and Eritrea, with low levels of monetization, the velocity of circulation is low. As stated 
by the IMF (1998), the velocity of money in Eritrea in 1992 was 1.6, and if we assume a reserve 
ratio of 5 per cent, the cash transfer of birr 1.3 billion to Eritrea would have generated economic 
transactions of about birr 41.6 billion between 1991 and 1993 alone. This combined effect of the 
increase in the money supply and velocity of money in Eritrea allowed the EPLF to “buy” 
Ethiopia’s goods, services, and assets worth much more than the initial cash transfers throughout 
the period of the common market, but the “purchase,” at least a good proportion of it, involved no 
corresponding transfer of goods from Eritrea to Ethiopia. There were consistent rumors that the 
EPLF used counterfeit birr to acquire Ethiopia’s resources. Validating these rumors, Kendie (2005, 
p. 357) writes, “Unscrupulous Eritrean merchants used forged Ethiopian birr and bought a variety 
of cereals from farmers in Gondar and Gojjam thus creating untold misery to the farmers.”  While 
the increase in the amount of birr in circulation, real or counterfeit, in Eritrea facilitated the EPLF’s 
resource acquisition in Ethiopia, it also generated inflationary pressure both in Eritrea and 
Ethiopia.  
The other financial transfer mechanism the EPLF used for acquiring Ethiopia’s resources 
was its use of multiple exchange rates for the birr — the official exchange rate, the auction rate, 
and the “preferential exchange rate”— depending on the transaction, while Ethiopia retained only 
one exchange rate, the official exchange rate until 1995 and the auction rate in the subsequent 
years, as noted by the IMF (1996). What the IMF calls the “preferential exchange rate” is actually 
the illegal exchange rate that the EPLF established without the consent of the NBE, the only 
monetary institution authorized to determine the exchange rate for the birr. The IMF observes that 
the EPLF used the “preferential rate” for “equilibrating” (IMF, 1995) its dollar holdings. What this 
IMF statement means is that the EPLF used the illegal rate for accumulating US dollars. For buying 
US dollars and selling the birr, the EPLF utilized the “preferential rate” and used its embassy in 
Addis Ababa, supporters, and party members (Asrat, 2014) and its companies, especially the Red 
Sea Trading Company and the Finance Commission (IMF, 1995), to carry out the transactions. 
Implementing a triple exchange rate regime, while Ethiopia was using only the official exchange 
rate, permitted the EPLF to siphon off Ethiopia’s foreign exchange, resulting in Eritrea’s 
“[C]omfortable foreign exchange reserve position” (IMF, 1995, p. 34) in the early 1990s. To 
demonstrate the extent to which the EPLF profited from establishing the illegal “preferential rate” 
for the birr, I calculated the difference between the auction rate and the preferential rate, expressed 
as a percentage of the auction rate for the period 1992 to 1997. The calculations show that the 
difference in the two rates was significantly high in the early years of the common market, 
particularly in 1992, but gradually declined and disappeared altogether after Eritrea introduced its 
own currency, the Nakfa, in 1997. Using multiple exchange rates allowed the EPLF to profit in 
the foreign exchange market, to accumulate foreign exchange, to ration foreign exchange, and to 
divert foreign exchange from Ethiopia. While the Eritrean government was pursuing a policy of 
multiple exchange rates for the birr, it was simultaneously advancing the “harmonization” of 
economic policy between the two countries (Asrat, 2014; ESAT, 2015; Tesfai, n.d.). 
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Service Charges at the “Free” Ports of Massawa and Assab 
Isaias Afeworki and EPLF supporters repeatedly assert how Ethiopia used Massawa and 
Assab as “duty free” ports for its exports and imports between 1991 and 1998, but this assertion 
overlooks the substantial port fees Ethiopia paid and the sizeable petroleum subsidy it provided to 
the Eritrean government, worth millions of US dollars. The service charges Ethiopia paid 
contributed to a large proportion of the EPLF’s nontax revenue between 1991 and 1998. An 
examination of the difference in port service fees during the common market and post-common 
market periods demonstrate that Ethiopia was an important source of port service revenue for the 
Eritrean government. In 1993, when the two fronts were close allies and Ethiopia was heavily 
dependent on Eritrea’s ports for its international trade, the port service fees accounted for close to 
10 per cent of Eritrea’s GDP, but after Ethiopia stopped using the ports in 1998, their share 
declined precipitously to 1.8 per cent in 1999 and to 1 per cent in 2000 (IMF, 1998, 2003). The 
data show that between 1993 and 1997 Ethiopia paid close to birr 1 billion in port fees. 
 
The Assab Refinery 
The Assab Refinery was built with a loan of birr 41.5 million from the USSR to the 
Ethiopian government to be paid in twelve years and with a further contribution of birr 2 million 
by the Haile Selassie government for consultation services (Aakalewld, 1966). The construction 
of the refinery started in 1964 and was completed in 1967. At the time, it was considered Ethiopia’s 
most important infrastructure project. When Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia in 1991, the transitional 
government of Ethiopia transferred the ownership of the refinery to the EPLF, without any 
recompense; however, the Friendship and Cooperation Agreement allowed Ethiopia to continue 
using the refinery and Assab as a “free” port, but required that it allocate 30 per cent of its refined 
petroleum products to Eritrea (IMF, 1995; Trevilli, 1998). Under the agreement, the Ethiopian 
Petroleum Corporation (now the Ethiopian Petroleum Enterprise) would pay for crude oil in US 
dollars and ship it to the refinery.  The refinery would refine the oil and deliver the refined products 
to the Ethiopian Petroleum Corporation, and the corporation would then sell predetermined 
quantities in birr to the Eritrean government. Through this complex, arcane, and unfair 
arrangement, the IMF (1995) reports that Eritrea fulfilled all of its needs for refined petroleum 
products without spending foreign currency, at highly subsidized prices, and almost for free since 
the EPLF paid for the products with some of the money that was transferred from Ethiopia. 
Although the 1993 agreement specifies that Eritrea’s share of the refined petroleum products 
would be 30 per cent, the actual proportion of the products that Eritrea received increased steadily 
during the common market years from about 17 per cent in 1992 to more than 54 per cent in 1997 
as illustrated by Figure 1. 
Given the differences in the sizes and the rates of growth of the economies of the two 
countries, there is no justification for the steep increase in Eritrea’s share. Nor is there any 
convincing argument for the allocation of 30 percent of the products to Eritrea in the first place.  
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Figure 1. Eritrea’s Share of Petroleum Products (1992-1997) 
Source: IMF, Staff Country Report, 1995 to 1998. 
 
How Eritrea’s share of petroleum products was determined remains a mystery, considering 
that Eritrea’s population was about 6 per cent of Ethiopia’s and its GDP about 10 per cent of 
Ethiopia’s in the 1990s. Particularly striking is Eritrea’s share of more than 54 per cent in 1997; 
such a disproportionate and exploitative allocation is indefensible by any criterion. Moreover, 
Eritrea’s share of certain key petroleum products was inexplicably much higher than Ethiopia’s 
throughout the years of the common market. In 1996, for example, Eritrea received, 51 per cent of 
the jet fuel, 76 per cent of the automobile diesel, and more than 78 per cent of the kerosene (used 
by households) produced at the refinery (IMF, 1998); this, despite the fact that Ethiopia had many 
more airplanes and vehicles than Eritrea and a population about fifteen times greater. Having 
supplied most of these products to Eritrea at low prices, Ethiopia was forced to buy the shortfall it 
needed for domestic consumption on the international market. Furthermore, Ethiopia had to pay 
for the spare parts of the machinery used at the refinery in US dollars, on top of the refinery fees, 
the costs of maintenance, the replacement of chemicals, and the salaries of the Eritrean employees 
in birr (IMF, 1995). Given that Ethiopia incurred other costs such as constructing the refinery, 
buying crude oil, transporting the oil to the refinery and refining the products, there was no 
rationale for giving Eritrea such a high proportion of the refined products. The arrangement not 
only supplied Eritrea with all the petroleum products it needed, but allowed the EPLF to pay low 
prices for the petroleum products at the refinery and to sell them at high prices to distributors 
throughout Eritrea, generating considerable revenue for the regime, as shown by the data on 
production, distribution, and wholesale price of petroleum products at the refinery, and the retail 
price of petroleum products in Asmara (IMF, 1995, 1997, 1998). Along with generating profit for 
the EPLF, Ethiopia, by selling the refined products to Eritrea in birr, saved the EPLF a large 
amount of foreign exchange during the years of the common market. Between 1992 and 1997, my 
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calculations show that Eritrea spent a total of birr 5.7 billion, saving about US $200 million when 
converted at the prevailing average auction exchange rate for each year.  
Ethiopia’s use of the “free” ports of Massawa and Assab, while generating direct and 
indirect economic benefits for Eritrea, was costly for Ethiopia, and when the EPLF demanded that 
its share increase to 40 per cent and that Ethiopia pay an additional birr 56 million for using the 
refinery (Trevilli, 1998) in 1997, the Ethiopian government eventually started looking for 
alternative sources of refined petroleum products on the international market. Predictably, the 
government found it much cheaper to buy the refined products on the international market than to 
incur the exorbitant cost in cash and kind to the EPLF. Ethiopia’s decision to stop using the Assab 
Refinery delivered a major financial blow to the Eritrean regime. 
 
Remittances of Eritreans Living in Ethiopia to the EPLF 
Remittance, comprising the 2 per cent income tax that the EPLF levies on Eritreans living 
abroad and the cash they send to support their families in Eritrea, have been a major source of 
revenue and foreign exchange for the Eritrean government. Styan (2007) claims that remittances 
account for about one-third of Eritrea’s GDP. The IMF, on the other hand, estimates remittances 
amounted to 50 per cent of Eritrea’s gross national income in the early 1990s (IMF, 1996), by far 
the largest proportion in the world. Remittances have been particularly important in financing 
imports for Eritrea.  
In the early 1990s, the IMF reported that the ratio of remittances to imports was 60 per 
cent, again one of the highest ratios in the world (IMF, 1996). Given the importance of remittances 
to Eritrea’s economy, how much did Eritreans living in Ethiopia contribute to the Eritrean 
government between 1991 and 1998? To understand the magnitude of their contributions, first we 
need to know how many Eritreans were living in Ethiopia in the 1990s, along with their average 
income. The number of Eritreans migrating to Ethiopia increased after the new government 
assumed power in 1991 (Kidane, 1999). Kidane, an EPLF official, claims that there were 550,000 
Eritreans living in Ethiopia in the late 1990s. How much did they contribute to the Eritrean 
government? Since there are no data on the remittances of Eritreans living in Ethiopia during the 
common market years, one is forced to estimate the amount relying on different data sources. 
When the Ethiopian government deported 70,000 Eritreans in 1998, declaring that they posed 
security threats to Ethiopia, they lost their businesses, livelihoods, and assets. Kidane (1999) 
asserts that in total they lost US $800 million worth of assets, which implies that on average, every 
deported Eritrean was a millionaire with an average asset of US $11.43 million, a highly-
exaggerated assertion. To illustrate approximately how much cash Eritreans living in Ethiopia 
contributed to the Eritrean treasury, assuming that out of the 550,000 Eritreans (Kidane, 1999) 
living in Ethiopia only one-fourth contributed birr 100 per month (not a heavy burden for a 
relatively well-off individual), the EPLF collected an estimated amount of birr 165 million per 
year between May 1991 and May 1998, for a total of more than birr 1.3 billion.  
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The Flow of Labor, Goods, and Services 
The agreements signed by the Meles Zenawi and Isais Afeworki governments provided for 
the free flow of labor, goods, services, and capital between the two countries, with the assumption 
that these would result in mutual benefits, as postulated by economic theory and supported by 
empirical findings from other countries; yet, in reality the benefits accrued mostly to Eritrea. Let’s 
start with the migration of people between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Although there had been inter-
migration of people between Eritrea and Ethiopia when it was part of Ethiopia, more Eritreans 
crossed over into Ethiopia because of better economic opportunities in the rest of Ethiopia. In the 
1980s, the war for independence reduced the net migration of Eritreans to other parts of Ethiopia 
(Kidane, 1999), but after Eritrea became independent, the close alliance forged between the two 
fronts improved the political, social, and economic standing of Eritreans living in Ethiopia, 
attracting many to migrate to Ethiopia until the outbreak of the war in 1998. The TPLF, in its 
determination to stay in power through practicing ethnic politics, viewed the Tigrigna-speaking 
Eritreans as its natural allies (Tesfai, n.d) and treated them favorably; so much so that under the 
TPLF-controlled government, Eritreans living in Ethiopia enjoyed more privileges than 
Ethiopians, many holding high positions in the government and owning lucrative businesses 
(Abbink, 1998; Kidane, 1999). While Eritreans were migrating to Ethiopia after 1991, the EPLF 
was busy deporting Ethiopians living in Eritrea. The exact number of Ethiopians deported by the 
Eritrean authorities is unclear; the reported figure varies between 126,000 (Yohannes, 1999) and 
150,000 (Gilkes as cited in Khadiagat, 1999).  
The precise figure for the number of deportees may be lacking, but there is no lack of 
information on the mistreatment of the deportees by the Eritrean government. Abbink (1998) 
reports that these people were expelled “[W]ithout any of their possessions” (p. 560). 
Woldemariam (2015) notes, “The expulsions took place in June of 1991 and caused a serious 
humanitarian crisis within Ethiopia that was only averted through emergency assistance from the 
US government” (p. 177). The US government may have provided some humanitarian aid, but the 
assistance was inadequate as the deported Ethiopians remained destitute (Abbink, 1998). Although 
these Ethiopians lost their homes, property, businesses, livelihoods, and dignity, the transitional 
government of Ethiopia was conspicuously silent about their plight; it provided no moral, social, 
or financial support. Abbink (1998) reports, “Many thousands of them today still live in the streets 
of Addis Ababa in self-built shanties of plastic, stones and corrugated sheets, jobless and without 
government support” (p. 560).  The Eritrean government abused them, the Ethiopian government 
snubbed them, and the international community ignored them. (There was no Amnesty 
International report on their inhumane treatment.) Because of the close relationship between the 
two regimes in 1991, as Abbink (1998) writes, “[S]tories about maltreatment, abuse and killings 
of Ethiopians in Eritrea at that time [were] suppressed for seven years” (p. 560).  Ironically, Isaias 
Afeworki was advocating the free flow of labor between Ethiopia and Eritrea and facilitating the 
migration of Eritreans to Ethiopia by demanding that they be treated like Ethiopians, while 
deporting thousands of Ethiopians (Trevilli, 1999; Asrat, 2014).  
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Eritrea’s Trade with Ethiopia  
The free flow of goods and services constituted an important aspect of the de facto Ethio-
Eritrean common market, as outlined in the 1993 Friendship and Cooperation Agreement and the 
subsequent pacts. To assess the direction, volume, and value of the flow of imports and exports 
between the two countries, it was to necessary to rely on data supplied in IMF reports, but most of 
the trade between the two countries was unrecorded and conducted through the informal sector, as 
is the case with most international trade taking place among developing countries, especially in 
Africa. Even though there are no estimates on the volume of informal trade between the two 
countries, the IMF (1995) states that it was much larger than the official trade statistics indicated.  
 
Eritrea’s Imports from Ethiopia 
During the common market period, Eritrea imported agricultural inputs duty free from 
Ethiopia for its manufacturing sector, principally leather, but among Eritrea’s imports from 
Ethiopia, food was the most important item. The official data demonstrate that Eritrea imported a 
large proportion of its food from Ethiopia; between 1992 and 1997, 30 per cent of Eritrea’s food 
imports came from Ethiopia (IMF, 1995–1998). If we take into account the unrecorded food 
imports from Ethiopia, Ethiopia should account for at least 50 per cent of Eritrea’s total food 
imports. Although both countries have not achieved self-sufficiency in food production, food 
imports from Ethiopia supplemented Eritrea’s food supply, especially during drought. Other than 
contributing to Eritrea’s food supply, food imports from Ethiopia benefitted Eritrea’s economy in 
other ways as well. Food imports from Ethiopia at relatively low prices, paid in birr, saved Eritrea 
foreign exchange, reduced the trade deficit (because of the informal food imports), kept the rate of 
inflation low, decreased the cost of manufacturing, and enabled Eritreans to enjoy a higher standard 
of living than they do today.  
 
Eritrea’s Exports to Ethiopia 
Eritrea’s manufacturing sector has been integrated with Ethiopia’s economy ever since its 
inception during Italian colonialism; the Italians established light manufacturing in Eritrea to sell 
their products mostly in Ethiopia. The integration of Eritrea’s manufacturing with Ethiopia’s 
economy accelerated after Eritrea became part of Ethiopia, and was affected by the economic 
policies of the previous governments in Ethiopia. To promote industrialization in Ethiopia the 
Haile Selassie and Derg governments followed a policy of import substitution in which they 
protected domestic manufacturers from foreign competition by imposing high tariffs on imported 
goods (Aberra, 1987). Since Ethiopia’s manufacturing sector in the 1960s and early 1970s was 
concentrated in Addis Ababa and Asmara (Gilkes, 1975, p.147), Ethiopia’s import substitution 
policy benefited factories located in Eritrea as well (Aberra, 1987; Gilkes, 1975). After Eritrea 
became independent, the transitional government extended the tariff protection to Eritrea’s 
manufacturing sector, as though Eritrea were still part of Ethiopia. The Eritrean government took 
advantage of the tariff protection and the common market arrangements, exporting virtually all of 
Eritrea’s manufactured goods to Ethiopia, as shown in Table I below.  
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Note: Numbers in Percent. 
Source: IMF, Staff Country Reports,1995 -2003. 
 
Using the trade data provided in the IMF reports, I have reproduced in Table 1 the 
proportion of Eritrea’s export of manufactured goods to Ethiopia between 1992 and 1997. The 
table shows that between 1992 and 1997, on average, Ethiopia accounted for close to 82 per cent 
of Eritrea’s total exports of manufactured goods. If we examine specific products, we realize that 
during this period, on average, Eritrea exported close to 90 per cent of its beverages and tobacco, 
more than 75 per cent of its crude materials, close to 100 per cent of its animal and vegetable oils, 
and more than 80 per cent of its chemicals and related products to Ethiopia. Moreover, the EPLF 
acted as an intermediary for some of Ethiopia’s international trade. It imported manufactured 
goods from abroad and sold them to Ethiopia at a higher price, making a profit on the transaction. 
The IMF data indicate that not all of Eritrea’s exports to Ethiopia were produced in Eritrea; some 
were manufactured elsewhere and re-exported to Ethiopia. It is not unusual for countries to re-
export products, and so the question is not why the EPLF bought foreign goods and sold them to 
Ethiopia at a profit, but why the Ethiopian government would use a middle trader and pay high 
prices when it could have imported the products directly from the producers itself.  
 
Estimating the Physical Assets Appropriated by the EPLF 
The favourable treatment of Eritrea by the Ethiopian government extended beyond the 
common market arrangement. The transitional government allowed the EPLF to assume the 
ownership of all of Ethiopia’s physical assets located in Eritrea without proper accounting, public 
consultation, or fair compensation. When Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia in 1991, the EPLF 
Table 1 
Ethiopia's Share of Eritrea's Export of Manufactured Goods (1992–1997) 
Exports 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Average 
Beverages and tobacco 70.4 87.5 90.4 90.2 98.1 95.8 88.7 
Crude materials 86.8 86.4 55.8 73.9 74.8 73.0 75.1 
Animal and vegetable 
oils  
NA  NA  NA  100 96.2 97.1 97.8 
Chemicals and related 
products 
100 48.8 90.4 91.7 85.1 67.8 80.6 
Manufactured goods 99.4 32.9 54.7 68.1 67.3 59.9 63.0 
Machinery and transport 
equipment  
101.5 85.7 87.4 68.8 74.7 53.3 79.3 
 Misc. manufactured 
articles 
99.8 84.1 90.6 87.5 71.5 97.1 88.4 
Total 93.0 70.9 78.2 82.9 85.1 77.7 81.9 
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inherited the physical assets and infrastructure in Eritrea such as hospitals, schools, government 
buildings, airports, seaports, highways, roads, and the buildings and factories of state-owned 
enterprises, all belonging to Ethiopian and Eritrean taxpayers. The EPLF also acquired the physical 
assets of the Ethiopian military, the Ethiopian Air Force, the Ethiopian Navy, Ethiopian Airlines, 
and Ethiopian Shipping Lines. The total value of the physical assets appropriated by the Eritrean 
regime may be billions of dollars, but the exact amount is unknown since there has been no official 
report from either government. With no public data available on the value of the physical assets 
that the EPLF inherited at the time of Eritrea’s independence, one is forced to estimate it. I have 
estimated the total value of physical assets in Eritrea at the time of independence and Ethiopia’s 
share of those assets. As the extensive literature on capital evaluation underscores, there are a few 
theoretical and measurement problems in estimating the value of capital (Sen, 1974; Pasinetti, 
Fisher, Felipe, McCombie & Greenfield, 2003). To avoid these estimation problems, it was 
necessary to use a simple statistical technique that economic historians like Piketty (2014) and 
development economists use in estimating the value of capital: the historical capital-output ratio. 
I realize that using the capital-output ratio does not solve the problems associated with measuring 
capital; it simply assumes it away.  
Still, these theoretical and data limitations notwithstanding, to get an idea of the value of 
physical assets in Eritrea at independence required estimating the average capital-output ratio on 
the basis of a simple Harrod-Domar growth model. The model shows that the capital-output ratio 
can be computed, given the savings rate and GDP growth rate. Using this equation, the estimated 
average capital-output ratio for Ethiopia between 1982 and 1992 is 2.4. Instead of using the data 
for only 1992, the savings and growth data for Ethiopia between those years was used to obtain a 
representative average capital-output ratio. This ratio is consistent with what one expects for a 
typical least developed country, one of the stylized facts of developing countries.  
It was assumed that the capital-output ratio in Eritrea in 1992 was the same as it was in 
Ethiopia; an assumption that reflects the economic realities of a country with a similar low per 
capita GDP, low capital investment, and low capital productivity. To estimate the amount of 
Eritrea’s physical assets at independence, based on a capital-output ratio of 2.4, it was important 
to know Eritrea’s GDP in May 1991, but since there are no macroeconomic data for Eritrea in 
1991, Eritrea’s GDP of 1992, US $5.9 billion (in constant 2005 US dollars) (World Bank, 2015), 
was used. This suggests that, with the assumed capital-output ratio of 2.4, the estimated total value 
of physical assets in Eritrea in 1992 was US $14.2 billion.  
But since physical capital includes land and non-land capital, the estimated amount of total 
capital has to be divided between the two categories of capital. If we take the IMF’s estimate that 
in the early 1990s agriculture contributed to about one-third of Eritrea’s GDP (IMF, 1995), and if 
we assume that the distribution in the value of land and the value of other assets was proportional 
to their share of Eritrea’s GDP, the estimated total value of land in Eritrea was close to US $4.3 
billion in 1992; and the remaining US $9.9 billion was the estimated value of the non-land physical 
capital. In the absence of data on the net flow of funds between Eritrea and the rest of Ethiopia, it 
is reasonable to conservatively assume that at least 30 to 50 per cent of the funds spent on capital 
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expenditures in Eritrea came from the rest of Ethiopia. The moderate figures suggest that the 
estimated value of physical assets in Eritrea belonging to the Ethiopian people varied between US 
$3 and $5 billion in 1992. It is understood that one may dispute the exact value of the assets seized 
by the EPLF, but one cannot dispute that the EPLF owes money to the Ethiopian taxpayers for the 
assets it appropriated in Eritrea.  
 
Military Assets Acquired by the EPLF 
While one can debate as to what proportion of Ethiopia’s physical assets in Eritrea was 
seized by the EPLF, there is no question about how much of Ethiopia’s military assets the EPLF 
captured in Eritrea: almost all of them. If we assume that Eritrea contributed on average 13 per 
cent of the revenue collected by the previous regimes in Ethiopia, the same proportion as its share 
of Ethiopia’s GDP in 1992, and that tax revenues were proportionally used to pay for military 
equipment, hardware, and other assets, only 13 per cent of the military assets captured by the EPLF 
belonged to Eritrea. In reality, the Derg allocated more than 13 percent of its budget to military 
spending and borrowed the money to finance its military expenditures, some of which has already 
been paid back and some of which will be settled by Ethiopian taxpayers. Once again, neither 
government has provided such data, but there is no question that the EPLF acquired a large amount 
of military assets when the Ethiopian army was defeated in Eritrea. To the victor belongs the spoils 
of war.  
 
Estimating Eritrea’s Share of the External Debt 
When a country disintegrates into separate states, as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia did, 
the successor states agree, usually under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank, on how to 
equitably divide the assets and outstanding debts of the former country on the basis of a mutually 
acceptable formula (Stahn, 2002; Williams, 1994). The criteria for sharing the assets, debts, and 
other obligations among the successor states could include the relative share of the successor 
state’s contribution to the former country’s GDP, population, tax revenue, government 
expenditures, or other variables (Stahn, 2002; Williams, 1994). When Eritrea separated from 
Ethiopia in 1991 and later declared independence in 1993, there was no official agreement on the 
division of Ethiopia’s assets and national debt between Eritrea and Ethiopia. In fact, in the words 
of Abbink (1998), “[N]othing was negotiated” (p. 562). There was only a private discussion 
between Meles Zenawi and Isaias Afeworki in which the Ethiopian autocrat agreed to transfer 
Ethiopia’s assets in Eritrea worth billions of dollars to the EPLF, and to cancel Eritrea’s share of 
Ethiopia’s national debt. Further, Meles Zenawi agreed to share Ethiopia’s foreign aid with Eritrea 
between 1991 and 1993 (Woldemariam, 2015).  
Meles Zenawi forgave Eritrea its share of Ethiopia’s outstanding external and internal debt, 
without any authority from the Ethiopian people or the Ethiopian parliament, and, thanks to this 
generosity, Eritrea started its nationhood debt free. Unlike estimating the value of physical capital 
that the EPLF inherited, computing Eritrea’s share of the external debt is relatively straightforward 
since there are official records of the debt with the lending countries and international institutions. 
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To give the reader an idea of Eritrea’s share of the national debt when it became independent, one 
of the most frequently used criteria in settling such disputes was utilized: a successor state’s share 
of the former country’s GDP (Stahn, 2002; Williams, 1994). In 1992, Eritrea’s share of Ethiopia’s 
GDP was 13 per cent, and this proportion can be used to estimate Eritrea’s share of Ethiopia’s 
national debt. The national debt includes domestic debt, but only Ethiopia’s external debt was 
taken to estimate Eritrea’s share. When Eritrea became formally independent in 1993, as indicated 
by data from the World Bank, Ethiopia’s external debt was US $9.7 billion in current dollars. If 
we assume Eritrea’s share of the debt was equal to 13 per cent of the total debt, the same as its 
contribution to Ethiopia’s GDP, its share of the debt in 1993 was US $1.25 billion, a conservative 
estimate because the calculation is based on equating the proportion of Ethiopia’s external debt 
spent in Eritrea with Eritrea’s share of Ethiopia’s GDP. The previous governments considered 
Eritrea strategically important and allocated proportionally more of the national budget to Eritrea 
than to any other province. If we assume they spent between 25 and 33 per cent of the national 
debt in Eritrea, its share of the debt becomes much higher; it varies between US $2.4 billion and 
US $3.2 billion, a huge birthday gift given to a breakaway province by a generous Ethiopian 
government.  
It is true that Ethiopia, as one of the most heavily indebted countries, had some of its 
external debt written off, and it is possible that Eritrea’s share may have been written off as well, 
but that is not the point. The point is equity, fairness, and accountability in sharing assets and 
liabilities, as acknowledged by the former governor of the National Bank of Eritrea (Welde 
Giorgis, 2010). Why would an Ethiopian government, least of all an unelected, unrepresentative 
government, take it upon itself to forgive 100 per cent of Eritrea’s share of the external debt while 
transferring a huge amount of Ethiopia’s wealth to Eritrea without any authority from the Ethiopian 
public or its representatives? Meles Zenawi’s unprecedented act of generosity raises serious 
questions about his stewardship of Ethiopia’s national economic interests.  
 
Conclusion 
The decision of the transitional government to enter into a preferential trade agreement 
with the EPLF that benefitted Eritrea was not due to its carelessness, negligence, indifference, 
naiveté, hubris, or incompetence. It was a rational political decision that the TPLF leadership made 
to consolidate its grip on power in the early 1990s, but it resulted in a net economic loss for 
Ethiopia and a net economic gain for Eritrea. The common market allowed the EPLF to transfer a 
large amount of Ethiopia’s resources, worth billions of dollars, to Eritrea over eight years. The 
transferred resources generated income, foreign exchange, and employment for Eritrea. 
Khadiagata (1999, p. 43), for example, asserts that the common market produced some 300,000 
jobs in Eritrea. Beyond the common market, the strategic alliance that the two fronts forged in the 
early 1990s, in part based on their shared negative attitude if not outright enmity towards Ethiopia, 
enabled the EPLF to acquire Ethiopia’s physical assets in Eritrea and to forego Eritrea’s share of 
Ethiopia’s national debt without any compensation or obligation to Ethiopia. The preferential 
treatment of Eritrea at the expense of Ethiopia by the TPLF-controlled government is emblematic 
74  http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/ijad/ 
of its resolve, even today, to stay in power by pursuing policies that undermine Ethiopia’s 
economic interests, national unity, and political transformation to democratic governance.   
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